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9IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900303-CA 
Priority #2 
vs. : 
RODNEY DONALD CARTER, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction 
rendered against appellant in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
presiding, for Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended). This court has jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
detain and search appellant at the airport. 
2. Whether, absent reasonable suspicion, appellant 
knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search of his person 
and bags, consistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The Constitutional provisions relevant to a determination 
of this case are: 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Rodney D. Carter, was charged with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended) (R. 6). 
On March 20, 1990, the trial court convicted appellant 
after a bench trial (R. 130). Thereafter, on May 6, 1990, the 
court sentenced appellant to a term of one to fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison. The said sentence was suspended in lieu 
of thirty-six months probation under the supervision of Adult 
Probation and Parole (R. 142). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 17, 1989, Detective Bart Palmer of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office and Lieutenant Dave Fullmer of the Utah 
State Narcotics Agency were on duty at the Salt Lake Inter-
national Airport. Their primary responsibility was to observe 
airline passengers in an effort to locate drug couriers (Tran-
script of November 11, 1989 Hearing, at p. 36-37, 57 [hereinafter 
"Tr."]). 
At approximately 5:15 P.M. on that day, both officers were 
observing passengers as they deplaned from an America West flight 
that had originated in Las Vegas (Tr. 37). As they watched the 
- 3 -
passengers enter the concourse, they noticed appellant, a black 
male, among the group (Tr. 37), Both officers noted that he 
scanned the crowd as he walked into the terminal (Tr. 37). He 
then turned and walked up the concourse. As he continued up the 
concourse, he turned and looked back in the direction of the 
officers approximately three times (Tr. 38). 
Both officers then began following appellant up the 
concourse, but temporarily lost visual contact with him (Tr. 
39). As they approached the "top" of the concourse, Palmer 
observed him in the pay telephone area to his left (Tr. 39). 
Palmer then proceeded to that immediate area and took a position 
in the cubicle next to appellant (Tr. 39). Neither officer could 
hear appellant speak to anyone, although he appeared to have been 
attempting a phone call (Tr. 40). Appellant was in the phone 
area for approximately "a minute or two" (Tr. 40). 
Appellant then hung up the phone and walked to the 
terminal escalator (Tr. 40). Once he got on the escalator, he 
quickened his pace and began walking past people as he rode down 
(Tr. 40). Upon reaching the bottom level of the terminal, he 
walked quickly out the exit doors, without stopping by the 
baggage claim area (Tr. 40). Palmer testified that he had to run 
in order to catch up with appellant, just as he was getting into 
a taxi (Tr. 43). 
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Once he caught up with appellant, Palmer identified 
himself and asked appellant if he could speak with him (Tr. 44). 
Appellant responded in the affirmative and Palmer asked to see 
his plane ticket (Tr. 43). Appellant stated that he thought he 
had left the ticket on the plane but searched his carry-on bag 
for it (Tr. 43). Appellant did produce an old ticket under the 
name of Warren Carter, which Palmer looked at and then returned 
to appellant (Tr. 52). Pursuant to Palmer's request, appellant 
checked his bag for identification, but was unable to find any 
(Tr. 43). Palmer then asked appellant if he was carrying any 
drugs. Appellant stated that he was not (Tr. 45). Palmer next 
asked if he could search appellant's bag himself and appellant 
stated that he could (Tr. 46). 
As he was searching appellant's bag, Palmer noticed that 
appellant was conversing with Fullmer, who had arrived on the 
scene when Palmer asked appellant for identification (Tr. 47-48). 
Fullmer stated that, as he observed appellant bend over to look 
in his bag for identification, he noticed a line above his waist 
running around his back (Tr. 70). Fullmer noted that appellant 
was wearing a black semi-dress shirt and that the "line" was 
noticeably protruding through the shirt as he bent over (Tr. 71). 
After making the observation, Fullmer asked appellant if 
he could search him (Tr. 72). Appellant responded, ngo ahead" 
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and turned his back to Fullmer (Tr. 72). Fullmer conducted the 
search and discovered two packages in the lower abdomen area 
which later were discovered to contain approximately 453 grams of 
cocaine (Tr. 78). Based on this discovery, Fullmer and Palmer 
escorted appellant to their airport office where he was formally 
placed under arrest (Tr. 77-79). Appellant subsequently was 
charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended) (R. 6). 
Prior to trial, the court denied appellant's motion to 
suppress, on the ground that the appellant's failure to produce 
an identification, coupled with the fact that a tape was strapped 
around his waist, furnished the officers reasonable suspicion to 
search him. The court further found that appellant voluntarily 
consented to the search (R. 123-24) (Addendum, p. 5). 
At trial, the court convicted appellant and thereafter 
sentenced him to a prison term of one to fifteen years. The 
prison sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on proba-
tion for thirty-six months (R. 130, 142). The instant appeal 
challenges the court's findings and conviction. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant submits that the trial court committed 
reversible error by denying his motion to suppress, which argued 
that the arresting officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop 
appellant at the airport. The fact that cocaine was subsequently 
discovered on appellant can not justify the illegal stop. 
Further, appellant's alleged consent to the search was involun-
tary and was obtained as fruit of the prior police misconduct of 
stopping appellant without having an articulable suspicion to 
believe he was involved in criminal activity. This court should 
therefore remand this case to district court and order that the 
evidence illegally obtained be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE SEIZED BY THE POLICE OFFICERS, WHO LACKED 
A REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN 
APPELLANT. 
Standard of Review. This court reviews determinations 
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error. 
State v. Robinson, 140 UAR 16 (Ct. App. 1990), at 6; see also 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). Appellant 
submits that the trial court in the instant case clearly erred in 
denying appellant's motion. 
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At the outset, appellant acknowledges that police officers 
can approach citizens and initiate a "consensual" confrontation, 
and that as long as there is no detention or seizure, there is no 
Fourth Amendment violation. Florida v. Royerf 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983). However, it is appellant's contention that what began as 
a "consensual" encounter in the instant case quickly escalated 
into a Fourth Amendment detention or seizure. Such detention was 
executed without benefit of a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion. Thus, appellant's Fourth Amendment rights, as well as 
his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
were violated. 
In Florida v. Royer, the Supreme Court dealt with facts 
similar to those present in the instant case. In Royer, the 
defendant was observed by two narcotics officers at Miami Inter-
national Airport where he purchased a one-way ticket to New York 
City. After concluding that he fit the so-called "drug courier 
profile," the officers approached him and asked if he had a 
moment to speak with them. Royer responded in the affirmative. 
Upon request, Royer produced an airline ticket and his driver's 
license. The ticket and his baggage identification indicated 
that his name was Holt, while his driver's license identified him 
as Royer. When asked about this discrepancy, Royer explained 
that a friend had made the reservation for him. At this point, 
according to the officers, Royer became noticeably nervous. 
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Without returning his ticket or identification, the 
officers asked Royer to accompany them to a large storage closet, 
which he did. Upon arriving there, they asked him if they could 
search his luggage. Without responding verbally, he produced a 
key and opened his suitcase, which contained controlled substan-
ces. The Court held that Royer's consent to the search was 
invalid because the officers had effectively "arrested" him 
without probable cause when they asked him to go to the "closet" 
without returning his ticket or driverfs license to him. Ld. at 
503. 
The Royer Court established a three-step analysis for 
courts to apply in police-citizen encounters: 
The first tier of police-citizen encounters 
involves no restraint of the liberty of the citizen 
involved, but rather, the voluntary cooperation of 
the citizen is elicited through non-coercive ques-
tioning. This type of contact does not rise to the 
level of a seizure and therefore is outside the 
realm of fourth amendment protection. The second 
category, the investigative stop, is limited to 
brief, non-intrusive detention during a frisk for 
weapons or preliminary questioning. This type of 
encounter is considered a "seizure" sufficient to 
invoke fourth amendment safeguards, but because of 
its less intrusive character requires only that the 
stopping officer have specific and articulable 
facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or is 
committing a crime. The third type of police-
citizen encounters, arrest, are [sic] 
characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search 
or detention. The fourth amendment requires that 
an arrest be justified by probable cause to 
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believe that a person has committed or is 
committing a crime. 
United States v. Armstrong, 722 F.2d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(citing Rover, 460 U.S. at 497-98). 
In its holding, the Rover Court emphasized the legitimacy 
of those situations where "law enforcement officers do not 
violate the fourth amendment by merely approaching an individual 
on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is 
willing to answer some questions by putting questions to him if 
the person is willing to listen. . . ." Id., citing Royer
 y at 
498. However, the Court then observed that the encounter with 
Royer lost its consensual nature at that point where the officers 
identified themselves as narcotics officers and asked him to 
accompany them to the office while retaining his ticket and 
driver's license. The Court stated that the circumstances there 
clearly amounted "to a show of official authority such that a 
reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to 
leave/ Rover, 460 U.S. at 502, quoting United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The Court then ruled that 
the stop was "more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an 
investigative detention otherwise authorized by the Terry line of 
cases." Id. at 504. Finally, the Court found that there was 
actually no probable cause to arrest Royer until after he had 
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been taken to the "office" and the suitcase had been opened. Id. 
at 507. 
Appellant submits that the facts in the instant case are 
very close to those in Royer. First, even if the initial stop 
was consensual, because appellant agreed to speak to Palmer, it 
lost its "consensual nature" when Palmer persisted in questioning 
him after he had been unable to produce his current ticket and 
had already provided a prior ticket. At that point, the consen-
sual police-citizen encounter had become, at least, a brief 
detention for preliminary questioning. It is clear that the 
officers from that point had neither a reasonable suspicion nor 
probable cause based upon their observations of appellant,, 
When Palmer then began searching appellant's bag, 
admittedly with the hope of discovering contraband, the detention 
was clearly of a non-consensual nature, despite the allegation 
that appellant allowed him to search (Tr. 46). Consensual type 
encounters clearly lose their voluntary nature when police begin 
searching. That is because the act of searching automatically 
signals the ending of questions and answers and the beginning of 
a new stage in the encounter. This "detention" stage requires a 
reasonable suspicion which neither officer had at that point. 
Although Fullmer later had sufficient information on which to 
make an arrest, that information was the end result of the 
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unlawful detention. Thus, the evidence discovered at that point 
should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United Statesr 371 
U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Arroyo, 136 UAR 13 (Utah 1990). 
In making the above mentioned argument, appellant 
maintains that when Palmer initially confronted him, neither 
officer had a reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to stop 
or arrest. Support for this position is found in State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where this court decided an 
airport "profile" case with facts similar to those in the instant 
case. 
In Seryf the defendant arrived in Salt Lake City at 11:05 
a.m. on a Delta flight from Florida. He was carrying a suitcase. 
There was nothing unique or unusual about his appearance or 
dress. Id. at 936. When he arrived at the gate area he looked 
around, waited for other passengers to pass him and then started 
walking along the concourse. He then looked around, went into a 
snack bar, and emerged a few minutes later with a soft drink in 
his hand. He proceeded across the hallway and into the pay phone 
area, where he entered one of the cubicles and sat down. While 
holding a phone receiver, he twice stood up and looked over the 
partition. Approximately three to five minutes later, he left 
that area and proceeded in the direction of the baggage claim 
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area, using a different route to leave than the one used to get 
there. At that point he was stopped by airport drug enforcement 
agents. Id. at 936. 
The agents, who were actually conducting a drug courier 
seminar for the Salt Lake City Police Department, had been 
observing defendant and had decided to follow him while several 
trainees watched. Ld. at 936. The agents initially asked to see 
the defendant's airline ticket, which he produced. However, the 
name on the ticket was not his. The agents asked for identifica-
tion, which defendant stated he did not have. However, he volun-
teered to them that the name on the ticket was not his and that 
it was incorrect due to an error made by Delta. Without asking 
for his proper identity, the agents asked the defendant for his 
destination, to which he replied Evanston, Wyoming. They then 
asked if they could search his bag. He refused and they let him 
leave. Id. at 937. 
The defendant then left, went down the escalator to 
baggage claim and then exited the terminal. He re-entered the 
building, looked around the baggage claim area and left again. 
Meanwhile, after releasing the defendant, one of the agents 
checked out the call back phone number left on the defendant's 
reservation and discovered that it had been changed to a non-
listed number. They then found the defendant and detained him 
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while a drug detection dog was located. The defendant was taken 
back inside the terminal and the dog alerted to his bag, which 
contained cocaine. 
In reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress, this court held that "the articulable objective facts 
known to [the officer] when he seized [defendant] did not support 
a reasonable suspicion that [he] was engaged in criminal 
activity." Ld. at 942. This court then noted the seven facts 
relied on by the state in support of the reasonableness of the 
stop: 
(1) [Defendant] arrived from Florida; (2) waited a 
few minutes at the gate and looked nervously around 
there and before entering the snack bar; (3) went 
to a telephone booth and twice stood up and looked 
in the direction of the officers; (4) took a 
strange route from the phone booth area back to the 
concourse; (5) possessed a plane ticket on which he 
claimed his name had been inaccurately recorded; 
(6) told [the agent] he had no identification on 
him; and (7) left a telephone number . . . that had 
been changed to an unpublished number. 
Id. at 943. 
After analyzing each of the proffered factors, the court 
concluded that although trained police officers may be "able to 
perceive an articulate meaning in given conduct which would be 
wholly innocent to the untrained observer," the officer had 
failed to show that in the context of the case before it. Id. at 
946. 
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There are also a number of other cases from both the 
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit addressing the issue of 
sufficiency of articulable facts to establish a reasonable 
suspicion in the context of an airport stop. For example, in 
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam) , the Court 
found insufficient the facts that the government relied upon in 
that case to support probable cause: The defendant had flown from 
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, a source city for cocaine. He had 
arrived early in the morning, when police activity was at a low 
ebb. The defendant had not checked any luggage. The defendant 
and his companion were attempting to hide the fact that they were 
together. See id. at 441. 
Similarly, in United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103 
(10th Cir. 1988), the court found the government's justification 
unpersuasive to support reasonable suspicion. In Santillanesr 
the defendant was on release pending trial on a drug charge. He 
was observed deplaning by the officer who had arrested him on 
that first charge. When the defendant attempted to avoid the 
officer, he was physically grabbed and held by the officer. The 
reason for detaining the defendant was that the officer believed 
that by leaving the jurisdiction, the defendant had violated the 
conditions of his release. In New Mexico (the district where the 
case originated), it was not a crime to violate conditions of 
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release. The court held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights had been violated by that detention, because at the time 
of the detention, there were no facts to establish that the 
defendant was engaged in the commission of a crime. Lei. at 1109. 
However, in United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 
(1989), the Court found that the presence of several "profile" 
established a reasonable suspicion to support detention. The 
defendant in Sokolow was about twenty-five years old. In July, 
1984, he paid cash for two round-trip tickets from Honolulu, 
Hawaii, to Miami, Florida, a source city for drugs. The return 
date was left open on the tickets. He paid for the tickets (the 
cost was $2,100) from a roll of $20 bills. The roll of bills 
contained about $4,000. At the time of the purchase the defen-
dant was wearing a black jump suit with gold jewelry. He 
appeared to be very nervous and was accompanied by a woman. The 
name that was given at the ticket counter did not match the name 
under which the telephone number he had given was listed. 
Neither the defendant nor the woman checked any luggage. The 
defendant stayed in Miami only 48 hours even though the round 
trip took 20 hours. During the return trip, the defendant was 
wearing the same clothing and appeared to be very nervous. Two 
narcotics detector dogs subsequently alerted to defendant's bags. 
Id. at 1583-84. 
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In reversing the court of appeals1 finding that the 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the 
Court noted that none of the facts articulated by the government, 
standing alone, could justify reasonable suspicion. However, 
under a totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court found that 
the facts established reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
engaged or about to engage in a criminal activity. See id. at 
1586.1 
Sokolow, however, is inapposite under the circumstances of 
the instant case. The officers in the instant case had nothing 
comparable to the suspicion articulated by the Sokolow officers. 
As earlier pointed out, this case is more analogous to Sery than 
to Sokolow. In Sery, this court held that circumstances similar 
to those of the instant case do not support reasonable suspicion 
See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 4 (1984) (initial 
encounter was consensual and did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, where one defendant ran when officers observed them 
and two other defendants gave the officers contradictory state-
ments); United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(initial encounter consensual where the officers asked the 
defendant what was in his zipped coat pocket and defendant 
responded by reaching up and unzipping the pocket). 
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required under the fourth Amendment. See Sery, 758 P.2d at 942. 
The facts relied on by the officers in the instant case 
are even weaker than those provided in Sery. Appellant's conduct 
consisted of looking around the concourse, using the telephones, 
3 
walking quickly down the escalator, and then walking quickly to 
the taxi area without stopping by the baggage claim area. Such 
conduct, without more, was "wholly innocent" and should not be 
made otherwise merely because the officers later on discovered 
cocaine in his possession. See Sery, 758 P.2d at 944-45. When 
they approached appellant, neither officer had reasonable 
suspicion to detain him. And although the confrontation began as 
consensual in nature, it quickly became more intrusive and less 
voluntary. At that point it became a seizure, one in which in 
view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave. United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); State v. Sery. 
It is important to note that the Utah Supreme Court has 
abandoned "tailgaiting" United States Supreme Court cases and has 
finally effectuated its oft-repeated willingness to rely more on 
the State Constitution and cases interpreting it. See State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (Utah Constitution provides 
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment). Thus, even if 
this Court finds Sokolow relevant to disposing the instant case, 
appellant submits that Sery, rather than Sokolow, should control 
the outcome of the question whether the officers had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion in stopping him. 
3 
The State acknowledged that this conduct is clearly consistent 
with innocent behavior (Tr. 60). 
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Thus, the trial court clearly erred in refusing to 
suppress the evidence seized from appellant as violative of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. This court should therefore reverse 
appellant1s conviction. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH 
OF HIS PERSON AND BAGS. 
A critical issue in this case is whether appellant 
voluntarily consented to the search of his person and bags as 
found by the trial court (R. 123-24). A review of the case law 
dealing with this issue is thus appropriate. 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the 
Supreme Court examined the "consent exception" to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In that case, the Court 
noted that one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant 
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is a 
search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent. The question in 
Schneckloth dealt with what the prosecution must prove to demon-
strate that a consent was "voluntarily" given. The Court held 
that the test to be applied is the traditional voluntariness 
test. The prosecution carries the burden of proving that the 
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consent was freely and voluntarily given and was not the result 
of duress or coercion. Voluntariness, the Court heldf is a 
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. 
The Court then discussed some of the factors to be considered 
when applying this totality-of-the-circumstances test: the defen-
dant's intelligence, whether or not the defendant was in custody, 
the nature of the police questioning and the environment in which 
the search took place, the defendant's knowledge of his right to 
withhold consent, and any other circumstances that weigh on the 
issue of voluntariness. 
The question of coercion as it relates to a consent to 
search at the airport has also been addressed by the Supreme 
Court. The primary issues raised in United States v. Mendenhall 
were whether airport authorities had illegally stopped the defen-
dant and whether she then voluntarily consented to accompany 
agents to an office. The Court found that the authorities acted 
properly in stopping and asking the defendant for identification. 
The Court went on to find that the defendant had consented to go 
to the office of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The 
officers had not kept the defendant's airline ticket or identi-
fication. The Court concluded that the officers' actions could 
be reasonably interpreted by the defendant to imply that she was 
not required to accompany them. 
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Conversely, in Florida v. Royery supra, the Court held 
that the stop of an individual on less than probable cause cannot 
justify a detention in a small room by two police officers. In 
Royer, the officers had retained the defendant's airline ticket 
and identification. They then had his luggage brought to the 
room where he was held. The Court found that such a situation 
would result in the defendant's belief that he was under arrest. 
Because the defendant had not been informed that he was being 
detained, the Court concluded that the encounter had lost its 
consensual nature. The Court went on to hold that, as a prac-
tical matter, Royer was under arrest. Since there was no 
probable cause to arrest him, the search was illegal. The Court 
then observed that: 
[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, 
the State has the burden of proving that the neces-
sary consent was obtained and that it was freely 
and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satis-
fied by showing a mere submission to a claim of 
lawful authority. 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a 
similar issue in United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th 
Cir. 1985). In that case, the defendant had been stopped for 
speeding in New Mexico. He produced a Virginia driver's license. 
The car was not registered to the defendant. The officer ran an 
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NCIC check to determine if the vehicle had been reported stolen. 
That check was negative. He then requested assistance from a 
backup officer, stating that he had a "gut instinct" that the 
defendant was transporting narcotics. The officer returned to 
the defendant's car and told him he could either plead not guilty 
or sign the ticket. When defendant signed the ticket, the 
officer asked him to step out of the car and then asked if he 
could inspect the trunk. During the inspection, the officer 
found that some of the screws in the molding had been tampered 
with. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany 
him to a nearby town, which the defendant agreed to do. At no 
time had the officer returned the defendant's driver's license, 
the vehicle registration, or the traffic ticket. At the police 
station, the defendant allegedly consented to the search of the 
car. 
In analyzing whether the trip was made with the 
defendant's consent, the Tenth Circuit employed a three tier 
analysis: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal and 
specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was 
given without duress or coercion, express or 
implied; and 
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(3) the court indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such rights were waived. See 
Recalde, 761 F.2d at 1453. 
In a recent case, State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), this court relied on Tenth Circuit case law for 
the test to be followed in determining if a consent is voluntary. 
This court noted that the test for voluntariness must be based on 
the totality of the circumstances of each case. To determine if 
a consent is voluntary, this court specifically cited the three-
part test from the Tenth Circuit cases. See id. at 888. 
In the instant case, the consent to search was not 
unequivocal and specific. It is important to note that appellant 
was alone with two police officers, whom he believed would not 
allow him to leave unless he yielded to their demands. Appellant 
was never informed of his right not to consent to the searches. 
Thus, he could not have freely and voluntarily consented to the 
searches as found by the trial court. 
Further, as earlier mentioned, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that the Utah Constitution provides broader protection 
4 
than the Fourth Amendment. 
See supra note 2. 
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In State v. Arroyo, 136 UAR 13 (Utah 1990), the court 
analyzed the standard for determining the validity of an alleged 
consent. In Arroyo, a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper had stopped 
the defendant's vehicle on a freeway after observing that the 
occupants were Hispanic and the vehicle had out-of-state license 
plates. The driver was cited for following too closely. A 
subsequent search based on a claim of consent revealed a kilogram 
of cocaine. The trial court found the stop pretextual and 
granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. On appeal, 
this court reversed the trial court, having found that the search 
was supported by consent. 
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this court, 
holding that the validity of a consent turns on a two-step 
analysis. First, the consent must have been voluntarily given, 
and, second, it must not have been obtained as a result of a 
prior police misconduct. See id. at 15. The court, therefore, 
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the defendant's consent was in fact voluntary and 
untainted by police misconduct. 
Similarly, in State v. Robinson, 140 UAR 16 (Ct. App. 
1990), one of the issues raised by the defendants was the 
voluntariness of the consent given to search the vehicle which 
the defendants were driving. The court concluded that the 
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consent to search was not voluntary. A review of the facts in 
Robinson will show that it is analogous to the facts in the 
instant case. 
In Robinson, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Anthony Garcia 
made a traffic stop of a gray van on April 12, 1988. After 
making the stop, Garcia spoke with the driver of the van, Mr. 
Towers, who produced a valid California driver's license. The 
passenger, Mr. Robinson, produced the registration, which showed 
that neither occupant was the owner of the van. At this point 
Trooper Garcia and Trooper Ogden (who arrived after the stop was 
made) questioned the occupants about the registration. Robinson 
indicated that the vehicle was owned by their boss who had 
allowed them to take it on a trip to Wyoming. Trooper Garcia 
checked for a stolen vehicle report on the van. There was no 
indication that it was stolen. The troopers then asked if the 
defendants were carrying any weapons, currency or narcotics and 
the defendants responded "no/ 
The troopers next requested that the defendants consent to 
a search of the van. When the rear doors of the van were opened 
by Robinson, the troopers observed a bed on a wooden platform. 
When asked what was under the platform, Robinson stated that it 
was their boss' property. The troopers asked how to gain access 
to the compartment. Robinson indicated that it was through the 
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side door and further indicated that the door was jammed. Garcia 
then opened the door and requested to take the base of the bed 
apart. When Robinson refused that request, the troopers 
indicated they would obtain a search warrant. Subsequently, 
Robinson agreed to allow a dog to go through the van. The dog 
alerted at the rear of the bed and a large quantity of marijuana 
was found. The trial court found that the defendants agreed to 
the search. 
In addressing the consent issue, this court cited 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), noting that the 
voluntariness issue must be resolved based on a totality of the 
circumstances. In doing so this court noted that the test "must 
take into account both the details of police conduct and the 
characteristics of the accused." Robinson, at 19. Additionally, 
this court stated that, even if the consent is voluntary, it must 
not be obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Id., citing Arroyo. 
In analyzing these facts, this court stated: 
Here, the defendants were first questioned 
about their right to possession of the van during 
the brief, initially invalid traffic stop. Once 
the legal basis for that stop ended, after a short 
period of detention, they were nonetheless not free 
to leave. They were detained and questioned about 
matters other than the traffic violation on the 
side of the interstate by two armed police officers 
with apparent, though false, authority to do so, 
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then ordered by one trooper to remain at the van 
and await his return. They complied with his 
commands. Next, they were questioned about whether 
they were carrying any contraband and asked to 
consent to a search of the vehicle. There is no 
evidence that Robinson was aware or was informed 
that he did not have to accede to the trooper's 
request. . . . At that time, it was apparent that 
the defendants would be kept in that custodial 
environment until the troopers satisfied their 
curiosity about the contents of the van, par-
ticularly the area under the bed. In light of the 
troopers1 questioning and conduct, the coercive 
atmosphere at the time, and the other surrounding 
circumstances, we conclude that the State has not 
borne its burden of proving that Robinson's consent 
to search the vehicle was voluntary. 
State v. Robinson, p. 19-20 (citation ommitted and emphasis 
added). 
There are certain critical similarities between the 
instant case and Robinson. In the instant case, the officers 
stopped appellant at the airport without a reasonable suspicion 
See Sery. The officers then ostensibly obtained a consent to 
search appellantfs bag and subsequently his person. Appellant 
submits that the consent to search in this case was neither 
unequivocal nor intelligently given. See Marshall. Appellant 
was never informed that he did not have to accede to the 
officers' request to search. Robinson. Further, even if the 
consent is found voluntary, it was obtained as a direct con-
sequence of the illegal stop. The time proximity between when 
the officer illegally stopped the defendant and when he obtained 
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the "consent" was so close as to have tainted the consent. See 
United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598 (1981) (even assuming that 
defendant's consent was voluntarily given, the evidence must be 
suppressed if not sufficiently attenuated from the prior miscon-
duct, because to rule otherwise "would encourage police officers 
to ignore the dictates of the fourth amendment"). Based on the 
cases cited heretofore, this court should find appellant's 
alleged consent to the search involuntary and obtained via prior 
police misconduct. Arroyo; Robinson. Appellant's conviction 
must, therefore, be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The seizure of the evidence in the instant case lacked 
reasonable suspicion or consent and was accomplished in violation 
of appellant's rights described in the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. This court 
should therefore, vacate appellant's conviction and sentence and 
order that said evidence be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1990. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RODNEY DONALD CARTER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891901201 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on the 11th day of December, 
1989. The State of Utah was represented by its attorney, GREGORY 
M. WARNER, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel, RONALD J. YENGICH, 
ESQUIRE. The Court having duly considered the evidence and 
testimony presented by the parties together with the party's 
argument thereon, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant deplaned from an airline which the 
police considered to be from an area of origin where drugs were 
considered available. 
2. As the defendant deplaned, he scanned the crowd. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 891901201 
Page two 
3- As the defendant proceeded down the corridor, he 
looked back at least three times. 
4. The defendant went to a phone bank which was not 
the first phone bank available, but was the second phone bank 
available, 
5. As the defendant was at the phone bank, he looked 
away from the police officer who had gone to the telephone next to 
the one the defendant was using, and it is the Court's finding that 
the officers involved had no ability to actually perceive what the 
defendant was doing. 
6. The defendant next proceeded toward the exit of the 
airport and walked fast down an __eJLev-a-fctrr rather than remaining 
stationary, 
7. The defendant was carrying a type of a duffle bag 
which appeared to be empty. 
8. The defendant did not have checked bags. 
9. The defendant proceeded directly to a cab stand and 
hailed a cab. 
10. The defendant approached the taxi. He had engaged 
the taxi, had placed his bag into the back seat and was contacted 
by an officer who told him he was a police officer, and asked the 
defendant if he would speak with him. 
11. The defendant was asked to talk to the officer in a 
location approximately 20 feet from the taxi, at which point the 
officers began to ask the defendant questions. 
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12. The defendant was asked for identification by law 
enforcement personnel and the defendant was unable to produce 
identification. 
13. The defendant's duffle bag was searched and an 
airline ticket used on a previous flight in the name of Warren 
Carter was revealed. 
14. Officer Fullmer detected a line just at or above 
the defendant's waist but under his outer clothing, but was unable 
to determine what material caused such line on the defendant's 
clothing. 
15. A pat down search was conducted by Officer Fullmer 
of the defendant and a bulge or bulges was found on the defendant 
at the time of such pat down. 
16. The defendant lifted his shirt and exposed masking 
tape which extended down into his pants and which the defendant 
indicated to the law enforcement personnel was for medical purposes. 
17. The defendant was returning from Nevada and had 
just a day or so before gone from Salt Lake to Las Vegas, which he 
demonstrated by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant. 
18. The defendant freely and voluntarily raised his 
shirt exposing the masking tape strapped around his body and the 
Court finds that the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to 
the police requests at least through the point of his voluntarily 
raising his shirt and disclosing to the police the masking tape 
that was bound around the trunk of his body. TV "U^ <^s <* * ^ c "tyfc n 
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19. The Court's determination of the facts was not a 
matter of the Court perfunctorily accepting the testimony of the 
police officers. The Court listened to both officers testimony and 
the testimony of the defendant, and after further reading the 
Transcript in lieu of a preliminary hearing previously submitted by 
counsel for the purpose of the hearing, the Court feels confident 
in crediting the testimony of the officers in this case. 
WHEREFORE, having heretofore entered its Findings of 
Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court specifically discredits the officers 
ability to form a reasonable articulate suspicion prior to the time 
of the defendant's failure to provide an identification upon 
request. 
2. The Court concludes that the absence or the failure 
of the defendant to produce identification also was not by itself, 
or in the aggregate with the previously listed factors, sufficient 
to indicate a reasonable articulable suspicion. 
3. The Court further concludes that the officer 
perception of a line just at or above the defendants waist, but 
under his outer clothing, was not a reasonable articulable 
suspicion by itself or in combination with anything previously 
noted. 
4. The Court further concludes that the pat down 
search and observations made by the officers, including the feeling 
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of the bulge, at that time was not sufficient to constitute a 
reasonable suspicion either alone or in the aggregate. 
5. The Court gives no weight individually or in the 
aggregate to those factors other than the lack of identification in 
conjunction with the lifting of the defendant's shirt and his 
explanation as to the tape on his body. 
6. The Court concludes, however, that the defendant 
freely and voluntarily consented to everything that went on, at 
least through the point of voluntarily raising his shirt and 
disclosing to the police what was around the trunk of his body and 
further that the pat down search was a free and voluntary 
consensual search. 
7. The Court concludes that a combination of the 
defendant's lack of identification under the circumstances where he 
was at the airport returning from Nevada and had just a day or so 
gone from Salt Lake to Las Vegas, which was demonstrated 
voluntarily by the ticket stub that was produced by the defendant, 
and in combination with the defendant freely and voluntarily 
raising his shirt wherein the defendant stated that what was 
strapped around his body was merely for medical purposes, and the 
observation of the police at that time that the taping was other 
than what is normally used in medical settings, and the fact that 
the taping was below the rib cage, gave rise to reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the defendant was involved in crime, and 
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therefore, from that point forward, law enforcement personnel were 
able to or had a right to interfere with the defendant's liberty. 
/ 
DATED this ___/_£_ day of January, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
/v 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
Third District Court Judge 
Aanxoved as to Form 
Ronald J. Yen 
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